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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CRAIG BURR and LOWELL CLARK, : 
Petitioners, : 
v. : Case No. 20040162-CA 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS : 
and THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW 
BOARD of the State of Utah, 
Respondents. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Decision and Final Agency Action of the Career Service Review Board 
(CSRB) was entered on December 22,2003. R. 413-30. Petitioners filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration on January 12,2004. R. 564-66. This motion was denied by the CSRB 
on January 27,2004. R. 583-84. Craig Burr's and Lowell Clark's Petition for Judicial 
Review was filed on February 25, 2004. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2002) and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Executive Director Haun did not abuse his discretion in denying the petitioners 
a four-step administrative salary increase (ASI) and the CSRB's decision upholding that 
decision should be affirmed. 
This issue was considered by the CSRB in its Decision and Final Agency Action. 
R. 413-30. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews an agency's interpretation of its 
own rules or regulations for abuse of discretion. Holland v. CSRB. 856 P.2d 678, 682 
(Utah App. 1993). This Court reviews the "CSRB's conclusion for correctness, granting 
no deference to that agency's decision." Id. 
The CSRB's role in examining the Department's personnel actions is a 
limited one. The CSRB is restricted to determining whether there is factual 
support for the Department's charges against [a grievant] and, if so, whether 
the Department's sanction of dismissal is so disproportionate to those 
charges that it amounts to an abuse of discretion. 
Career Service Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of Corr.. 942 P.2d 933, 942 (Utah 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4) 
(4) The Board's Standards of Review. The board's standards of review 
based upon the following criteria: 
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational according 
to the substantial evidence standard. When the board determines that the 
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational 
based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its 
discretion, correct the factual findings, and also make new or additional 
factual findings. 
(b) Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the 
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the 
factual findings based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the 
board must then determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly 
applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes according to the correctness 
standard, with no deference being granted to the evidentiary/step 5 decision 
of the CSRB hearing officer. 
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(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB 
hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the 
agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings 
and correct application of relevant policies, rules, and statutes determined 
according to the above provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Burr and Clark filed their employee grievances on May 28, 1998. R. 1-11. In their 
grievances, the petitioners claimed that other employees of the Department of 
Corrections, who shared their salary range and fulfilled similar jobs, were being paid 
more than they were. They requested that they each receive a four-step salary increase. 
R. 1 & 6. Their grievance was denied by the Executive Director of the Department of 
Corrections, H.L. Haun. R. 39-40. 
On appeal to the CSRB, Corrections' decision was affirmed by the Hearing Officer 
on December 13, 2002. R. 397-409. On further administrative review, the Hearing 
Officer's decision was sustained by the CSRB on December 22, 2003. R. 413-30. 
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 12, 2004. R. 564-66. This 
motion was denied by the CSRB on January 27,2004. R. 583-84. Craig Burr's and 
Lowell Clark's Petition for Judicial Review was filed on February 25, 2004. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The following facts are taken from the findings of fact of the hearing officer. R. 
398-400. The petitioner has not sought to challenge these particular findings. 
Burr and Clark are career service employees working for the Utah Department of 
Corrections at the Gunnison Prison. At the time they filed their grievances, both sought a 
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four-step salary increase "which they allege will compensate them in a manner consistent 
with others who have equal or less education and/or experience." R. 398. At that time 
each petitioner was a Correctional Captain, a position with a salary range from pay step 
47 to pay step 64. Burr was at step 50 and Clark was at step 49. 
Between the time that Burr filed his grievance on May 28, 1988, and the Hearing 
Officer made his findings of fact, Burr received salary increases that raised his pay by 
seven steps to step 58. Four of these step increases were administrative salary increases 
(ASIs) such as were requested in the grievance. R. 398. Clark's salary was also 
increased by seven pay steps, to step 57. Four of these increases were also ASIs. Id 
Both petitioners had been transferred among the positions of Correctional 
Institution Program Coordinator (IPC), Correctional Support Services Supervisor III 
(SS III), and Correctional Captain since first becoming captains. These three employment 
positions in Corrections were found to be somewhat interchangeable.1 Petitioners sought 
to compare their salaries (pay steps) against those of two other Corrections "captains," 
William Carlson and Randall Harr, who were making two to four dollars more an hour 
than they were. R. 398-99. 
1
 Petitioners do not challenge the CSRB's amendment of this finding of fact. The 
CSRB found the three positions to be functionally interchangeable and so corrected the 
Hearing Officer's finding of fact on this point. R. 424 at n.16. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah's laws and regulations do not mandate that all employees in a certain salary 
range be paid on the basis of seniority or educational background. The ASIs sought by 
the petitioners were within the discretion of the Department of Corrections to award. 
Corrections' denial of the grievances was not an abuse of that discretion. 
The petitioners failed to marshal the evidence in support of the CSRB's challenged 
factual finding and their challenge should therefore be rejected 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CSRB CORRECTLY UPHELD THE DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS' DENIAL OF THE PETITIONERS' GRIEVANCES 
The CSRB is required to give deference to the decisions of those agencies that 
come before it. Utah Dep't of Corr. v. Despain. 824 P.2d 439,442 (Utah App. 1991) 
(CSRB required to give deference to the personnel decisions of agencies). 
Petitioners claimed that they were not adequately paid because some other 
employees who had the same salary range as they were being paid more. Burr and Clark 
look only to length of employment and educational experience in claiming that their 
seniority entitles them to the same pay as others performing the same or similar functions. 
To rectify this perceived inequity, the petitioners asked Corrections to grant them a four-
step ASI. 
In denying their grievance, Corrections identified employees being paid different 
salary rates because of different hiring dates, performance ratings, tenure and educational 
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attainments as being grounds for not exercising its discretion to grant the requested ASI. 
R. 39, relying on documentation provided by the petitioners (R. 38). Corrections found 
that the pay differences in question flowed from such reasons and denied the grievances. 
R.40. 
Following a long line of prior decisions of the CSRB and its predecessor, the 
Personnel Review Board (PRB), the CSRB determined that Utah law does not require 
identical pay rates for employees performing similar or even the same duties. In rejecting 
the petitioners' arguments, the CSRB explained: 
In Lund,2 the PRB went on to conclude that: 
"[T]here will likely always exist salary inequities for some 
employees given the size of the State's work force, its turnover and hiring 
practices, its change in philosophies by different administrations and 
department executives, its rather persistent changing of personnel rules in 
order to adapt to changing conditions and exigencies, and for other germane 
reasons that need not be included herein. (Id.) 
Following the Lund decision, the Board again decided a pay equity 
salary grievance in C.C. Patel v. Div. of Envtl. Health. 4 CSRB 37 (1991). 
In this case, the Board held that: 
Previously the Board has noted that not all employees with the same 
job title are paid at the same rate. The State's current pay plans do not 
contemplate identical pay rates for similarly situated employees because 
variable factors foster pay rate differences. Variations in employees' 
salaries result from such factors and conditions as promotions, career 
mobility assignments, varying amounts of merit money increases, 
legislatively-imposed Statewide salary freezes, cost of living adjustments 
(COLAs) which alter the State pay plans' entry rates (creating salary 
compression), length of service, long-term leaves of absence, interrupted 
service and rehiring [sic], reassignments, disciplinary penalties, and other 
job-related factors. 
2
 Lund v. Div. of Health Care Fin., 3 PRB 24 (1987) 
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R. 419 (footnote added). 
The CSRB correctly determined that the petitioners had failed to state a claim in 
their grievance. They did not allege that their pay was outside the salary range 
established for their positions. Utah's laws and regulations do not mandate that all 
employees in a certain salary range be paid on the basis of seniority or educational 
background. 
Pursuant to a long line of prior decisions, the CSRB correctly found that many 
other factors may influence the decision as to which pay step within the appropriate salary 
range a particular employee might receive. In its decision, the CSRB cited to various 
reasons in the work history of Harr and Carlson (the two other captains) that appeared to 
explain why their salaries were different from those of the petitioners. R. 424-26. These 
differences included varying initial salaries, salary adjustments for temporary assumption 
of higher level positions, "career paths [that] have been diverse and separate from each 
other." R. 425. 
The petitioners admit that Corrections' decision on their request for a four-step 
ASI was committed to the discretion of the Executive Director. Brief of Appellants at 25-
32. In his discretion, the Executive Director could grant an ASI where he found it 
appropriate. The CSRB correctly determined that Corrections had not abused its 
discretion in denying the petitioners' grievances. Such discretionary personnel powers do 
not create entitlements upon which a petitioner can grieve. 
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Discretionary personnel powers granted to agencies do not constitute 
mandates. Absent a statutory mandate that an employee receive a certain 
benefit, the employee may not demand it as a right. 
Lopez v. CSRB. 834 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah App. 1992) (discretionary power to permit job 
sharing did not establish right to grieve denial of request). No mandate requires that ASIs 
be provided. The CSRB correctly denied the petitioners' grievances. 
The petitioners mistakenly rely on a provision of Utah's Administrative 
Procedures Act to claim that Corrections, having granted an ASI to one employee 
(Braithwaite), was bound by the "prior practice" so established and required to grant the 
ASIs requested by the petitioners. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (2000). First, as 
pointed out by the CSRB in its decision (R. 428), this statute does not apply to personnel 
decisions made by Corrections. "This chapter does not govern . . . internal personnel 
actions within an agency concerning its own employees, or judicial review of those 
actions." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(2)(d) (Supp. 2004). "The Legislature has 
specifically designed and created the USPMA and the State's Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures codified at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-101 et seq. to address internal personnel 
actions within an agency concerning its own employees and review of those actions." R. 
428. 
Further, both the Hearing Officer and the CSRB correctly found that the grant of a 
single ASI requested by an employee did not create a prior practice that would mandate 
that all other requests for an ASI must be granted. R. 408 & 428. 
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Admittedly Director Haun's final order did not specifically address why 
Braithwaite's ASI was granted while Grievant's ASI's were denied. 
However, his final order does indicate in the fourth paragraph on page 1 
that any comparisons outside the rank of captain would be comparing 
"apples to oranges." That reference, coupled with the fact that Braithwaite 
is a licensed professional pharmacist, rather than a captain, arguably 
explains Director Haun's reason for treating them differently. Moreover, 
characterizing the granting of a single ASI as a "prior practice" may be 
stretching the meaning of the word "practice." No evidence was submitted 
regarding how many ASI's were denied. 
R. 408 at n.6. 
Petitioners simply presented the fact that Braithwaite was granted an ASI. No 
evidence is cited as to the factual circumstances surrounding Braithwaite's request and 
why it was granted. The Hearing Officer and the CSRB correctly rejected the petitioner's 
claim that the simple fact that an ASI was granted to pharmacist meant that captains were 
also entitled to one. 
Nor did the CSRB err in rejecting the petitioners' reliance on the Utah State 
Personnel Management Act (USPMA). The USPMA requires the Department of Human 
Resource Management (DHRM) to design and administer a statewide classification and 
pay plan. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-8 (Supp. 2004). DHRM is required to classify 
positions by their duties and responsibilities to assure that "the same salary range is 
applied equitably to each position in the same class." Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12(3)(b) 
(Supp. 2004). Nothing in the USPMA requires that all state employees within a particular 
salary range be paid the same wage based on seniority or education. Indeed, the salary 
range set by DHRM is required to be wide enough "to reflect the normal growth and 
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productivity potential of employees in that class." Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12(4)(c)(ii) 
(Supp. 2004). The petitioners' reliance on the USPMA is erroneous and was properly 
rejected by the CSRB. 
The CSRB was correct when it upheld the Department's denial of the petitioners' 
grievances and that decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
II. PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT THEIR CHALLENGE TO THE FACTUAL 
FINDINGS OF THE CSRB 
Petitioners claim that the CSRB failed to properly support its decision to change 
one of the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. Brief of Appellants at 17-25. The Hearing 
Officer's Finding of Fact 29 stated: 
Notwithstanding the fact that different positions, hire dates, budgets, 
freeze years, performance evaluations, and career paths might potentially 
account for the differences in pay between Grievant Burr, Grievant Clark, 
Mr. Carlson, and Mr. Harr, no specific reasons were identified for the 
differences in pay. 
R. 400. 
In finding that the record did contain explanations as to why a difference of pay 
existed, the CSRB cited to various reasons in the history of Harr and Carlson that 
appeared to explain why their salaries were different from those of the petitioners. R. 
424-26. These differences included varying initial salaries, salary adjustments for 
temporary assumption of higher level positions and the fact that these four individuals' 
"career paths have been diverse and separate from each other." R. 425. The petitioners 
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erroneously focus on only one citation to the record found at the end of this three-page 
discussion. 
But more importantly, by focusing on the record citation in the CSRB's decision, 
the petitioners seek to reverse the burden of proof as to whether a finding of fact is 
supported by the whole record. They attempt to place the burden on the CSRB to set 
forth all evidence that supports the findings in its written decision. No such requirement 
exists. It is the burden of the petitioners, and not the CSRB to marshal the evidence. This 
they have failed to do. 
A party challenging the factual findings of the CSRB has a duty to marshal the 
evidence. 
Furthermore, when challenging an agency action as not based upon 
substantial evidence, appellants have a duty to marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, the 
[Board's] findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 
Road Runner Oil Inc. v. Bd. of Oil Gas and Mining. 2003 UT App 275, f 10, 76 P.3d 
692 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Covey v. Covey. 2003 
UT App 380,1J27, 80 P.3d 553 ("In order to successfully challenge the trial court's 
findings of fact, Almon must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding[s] and 
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding[s] even 
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below.ff) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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In seeking to shift the burden to the CSRB, petitioners argue that it was the duty of 
the CSRB to cite to all of the record evidence in support of its factual findings. Such a 
claim is not supported by the very decision on which they rely. In Grace Drilling v. 
Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989), this Court explained the test for 
reviewing an agency's factual conclusions under the "whole record" or "substantial 
evidence" test. The Court did not put a burden on the agency to cite to all such evidence 
in its decisions. Instead, the Court made it clear that it was still an appellant's duty to 
marshal the evidence supporting the agency's findings. 
It is important to note that the "whole record test" necessarily requires that a 
party challenging the Board's findings of fact must marshall all of the 
evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, 
and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
IcL 
Petitioners failed to marshal the evidence. Their challenge to the factual finding of 
the CSRB should therefore be rejected. Even if petitioners had marshaled the evidence, 
they still have failed to address an important point raised by the hearing officer. 
Petitioners assume that a failure to have evidence in the record proves that they should 
prevail. But they have not challenged the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the 
petitioners had the burden of presenting evidence on this issue. "As set forth in finding 
no. 29, many factors could account for the differences in pay, but no specific reasons 
were pointed out by either side. Since Grievants bear the burden of proof in this case, it 
was incumbent on them to put forth more evidence on that issue." R. 401 at n.3. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons presented above, the CSRB's final agency action should be 
affirmed. 
RESPONDENTS DO NOT DESIRE ORAL 
ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 
Respondents do not request oral argument and a published opinion in this matter. 
The questions raised by this petition are not such that oral argument or a published 
opinion is necessary, though the respondents desire to participate in oral argument if it is 
held by the Court. * 
DATED this / ^ day of October, 2004. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Case No. 18 CSRB/H.0.259 
Hearing Officer: J. Francis Valerga 
THE STEP 5 HEARING TO DETERMINE the above-entitled matter was held on August 14 
and 15, 2002, Conference Room 1120, State Office Building, Capitol Hill, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
before J. Francis Valerga, Career Service Review Board Hearing Officer. Craig Burr and Lowell H. 
Clark (Grievants), were present and represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law. The Utah 
Department of Corrections (Agency and UDC), was represented by Patrick B. Nolan, Assistant 
Attorney General. David Salazar was present as the Agency representative. A certified court 
reporter made a verbatim record of the proceedings. Witnesses were placed under oath. Testimony 
and documentary evidence were received into the record. The Hearing Officer (Presiding Officer, 
Utah Code, Section 63-46b-2(l)(h) (2002), now makes and enters the following: 
AUTHORITY 
The authority of the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) to hold this Step 5 Hearing is 
found at Utah Code, Section 67-19a-406 (2002) and Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-1 etseq. 
(2002). 
ISSUES 
Are Grievants entitled to prevail in their salary grievance? If so, what is the appropriate 
remedy? 
nnn^cr; 
^03 3 i l l FINDINGS OF FACT 
Stipulated Facts1 
1. Grievants Burr and Clark are career service employees and were career service employees 
at the time of filing the grievance on or about May 28,1998. Both Grievants are presently employed 
by the Utah Department of Corrections. They are both assigned to the Gunnison Prison. 
2. Both Grievants are seeking a four-step increase which they allege will compensate them 
in a manner consistent with others who have equal or less education and/or experience. 
3. Since he filed his grievance, Grievant Burr has received the following step increases: 
27 June 1998, Merit to Step 51 
27 June 1998, ASI to Step 52 
26 June 1999. Merit to Step 53 
26 June 1999, ASI jo Step 55 
24 June 2000, ASI to Step 5S 
23 June 2001, Merit to Step 57 
23 June 2001, ASI to Step 58 
1 June 2002, no increase 
Since the filing of the grievance, Grievant Burr has received 8 step increases. 
4. Since Grievant Clark filed his grievance, he has received the following step increases: 
27 June 1998, Merit to Step 50 
27 June 1998, ASI to Step 51 
26 June 1999, Merit to Step 52 
26 June 1999, ASI to Step 54 
24 June 2000, ASI to Step 55 
23 June 2001, Merit to Step 56 
23 June 2001, ASI to Step 57 
Since the filing of the grievance, Grievant Clark has received 8 step increases. 
5. Hie Step 4 Final Order denying the grievance was signed by the Executive Director on 
18 July 2000. 
6. Grievant Burr has a Bachelors Degree in Business Management. 
7. As of April 2001, William Carlson had occupied the position of Captain for 48 months. 
8. As of April 2001, Grievant Burr was earning $20.72 an hour. As of Jxme 2001, and 
through the date of the Step 5 Hearing, Grievant Burr is earning $21.88 an hour. 
1
 The stipulated facts herein are written exactly as submitted by the parties at the Step 5 hearing. The only 
exception is some minor editing by the Hearing Officer for the purpose of maintaining internal consistency with the 
rest of the Decision. Style changes were not made. 
Burr and Clark v. Corrections, 18 CSRB/H.O. 259 Page 2 
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9. As of April 2001, Grievant Clark was earning $20.17 an hour. As of June 2001, and 
through the date of the Step 5 Hearing, Grievant Clark is earning $21.29 an hour. 
10. As of April 2001, Mr. Carlson was earning $23.09 an hour. As of June 2001, and 
through the date of the Step 5 Hearing, Mr. Carlson is earning $24.38 an hour. 
11. Grievant Burr was hired by the Agency in September 1990. 
12. Grievant Burr made grade 25 in May 1991. 
13. Grievant Clark was hired by the Agency in November 1983. 
14. Grievant Clark made grade 25 in June 1993. 
15. Mr. Carlson was hired by the Agency in October 1991. 
16. Mr. Carlson made grade 25 in September 1993. 
17. Randall Keven Harr was hired by the Agency in June 1990. 
18. Mr. Harr made grade 26 in September 1993. 
19. Mr. Harr was making in excess of $25.00 an hour as of January 2001. 
Facts Found at the Hearing 
20. At the time Grievant Burr filed his grievance in May 1998, he held the position of 
Correctional Captain with a salary range between steps 47 and 64. He was being paid at step 50, and 
became a Captain in April 1992. 
21. At the time Grievant Clark filed his grievance in May 1998, he held the position of 
Correctional Captain with a salary range between steps 47 and 64. He was being paid at step 49, and 
became a Captain in June 1993. 
22. Unlike Grievant Burr, Grievant Clark, Mr. Carlson, and Mr. Harr do not have college 
degrees. 
23. Both Grievants have been transferred by Agency management between the positions of 
IPC, SS HI, and Captain since becoming Captains.2 
24. The salary ranges for the positions of IPC, SS HI, and Captain are all the same, i.e., 
steps 47 through 64. 
25. While the positions of IPC, SS IE, and Captain have been treated over the years 
somewhat interchangeably, they are not all Captain positions because their functions are different. 
2
 The terms "IPC," "SS III," and "Captain" as defined in the Step 5 Hearing stand for Correctional 
Institution Program Coordinator, Correctional Support Services Supervisor III, and Correctional Captain, 
respectively. 
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26. The positions of IPC, SS m, and Captain are all on the same level of the Agency's 
organizational chart. 
27. The Agency has on occasion addressed pay inequity issues by granting administrative 
salary increases (ASFs) as provided for in administrative rule R477-7-4(ll). One of the ASFs 
previously granted was a seven- step increase given to an employee named Braithwaite at or about 
the time the ASFs requested by Grievants were denied. 
28. The positions of IPC, SS HI, and Captain are benchmarked to the corrections officer 
position. 
29. Notwithstanding the fact that different positions, hire dates, budgets, freeze years, 
performance evaluations, and career paths might potentially account for the differences in pay 
between Grievant Burr, Grievant Clark, Mr. Carlson, and Mr. Harr, no specific reasons were 
identified for the differences in pay. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The burden of proof in non-disciplinary grievances is on the person bringing the 
grievance. Utah Code, Section 67-19a-406(2)(c) (2000). Therefore, since this is a non-disciplinary 
grievance, Grievants have the burden of proof. 
2. The standard used to determine whether Grievants have met their burden of proof, is 
"substantial evidence." Utah Code, Section 67-19a-406(2)(c) (2000). Therefore, Grievants must 
prove the allegations in their grievance by substantial evidence. 
3. "Substantial evidence" means "more than a mere scintilla of evidence," but less than "the 
weight of the evidence." "Substantial evidence" is such quantum and type of "relevant evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Zissi v. State Tax 
Commission, 842 P.2d 848, 853 (Utah 1992); Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63,68 
(Utah App. 1989). 
4. The evidence in this case shows that Grievants have received all salary increases to which 
they were entitled by law and are being compensated fairly based upon their experience, education 
and longevity. 
\f 5. The granting or denying of an ASI in accordance with Utah Administrative Code, 
R477-7-4(l 1) is not mandatory. It is discretionary with the agency head. 
6. The denial by the then executive director, Pete Haun, of the ASFs sought by Grievants 
under R477-7-4(l 1) was neither arbitrary and capricious nor an abuse of discretion. 
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[/ 7. The Agency has not violated Utah Code, Sections 67-19-12 (3)(a), 67-19-12 (3)(b), or 
67-19-3.1 of the Utah State Personnel Management Act by its actions in this case because the 
responsibility for enforcing and carrying out those statutes belongs to the Department of Human 
Resource Management, and the Agency cannot undertake functions which are reserved by law to 
another agency. 
' 8. Utah Code, Sections 67-19-12 (3)(a) and (b) do not mean that employees who have 
similar education and experience and who are classified the same because they do the same work, 
must receive the same salaries. They mean such employees must have the same salary ranges. 
9. The decision to deny an ASI at Step 4 of the State Grievance and Appeals Procedure is 
an internal personnel action, and is therefore exempt from the provisions of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act in accordance with Utah Code, Section 63-46b-l(2). 
THE GRIEVANTS' CASE 
Grievants argue that they are the victims of a pay inequity in that two other Agency 
employees in their same job classification do the same work they do but are paid more.3 Grievants 
claim that such pay inequity violates three state statutes, to wit: Utah Code, Sections 67-19-12 (3)(a), 
67-19-12 (3)(b), and 67-19-3.1 (l)(b). The three statutes read in pertinent part as follows: 
The director shall prepare, maintain, and revise a position 
classification plan for each employee position not exempted under 
Subsection (2) to provide equal pay for equal work. Utah Code, 
67-19-12 (3)(a). 
Classification of positions shall be based upon similarity of duties 
performed and responsibilities assumed, so that the same job 
requirements and the same salary range may be applied equitably to 
each position in the same class. Utah Code, 67-19-12 (3)(b). 
The department shall establish a career service system designed in a 
manner that will provide for the effective implementation of the 
following merit principles: 
. . . .providing for equitable and competitive compensation. Utah 
Code, §67-19-3.1 (l)(b). 
The two employees with whom Grievants compare themselves are William Carlson and Randall Keven 
Harr. Grievants Burr and Clark make $21.88 and $21.29 respectively, while Mr. Carlson and Mr. Harr make $24.38 
and over $25.00 respectively. As set forth in finding no. 29, many factors could account for the differences in pay, 
but no specific reasons were pointed out by either side. Since Grievants bear the burden of proof in this case, it was 
incumbent on them to put forth more evidence on that issue. 
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Furthermore, Grievant's argue, a mechanism exists that would allow the Agency to remedy 
the pay inequity. That mechanism is an ASI as provided for in R477-7-4 (11) The ASI rule, as 
it existed when the grievances were filed, read in pertinent part as follows: 
(11) Administrative Salary Increase 
The executive director or commissioner authorizes and approves 
Administrative Salary increases under the following parameters: 
* * * 
(c) Justifications for Administrative Salary Increases shall be: 
* * * 
(iii) Supported by issues such as: special agency conditions or 
problems, equity issues, or other unique situations or considerations 
in the agency. (Emphasis supplied). 
Grievants argue that the then executive director, Pete Haun, used the rule to grant a 
seven-step ASI to an employee named Braithwaite while contemporaneously denying their request 
for four-step ASFs. Grievants argue that while the granting of an ASI is discretionary with the 
Agency director, the denial of their ASFs was arbitrary and capricious in view of the ASI granted 
to Braithwaite. 
As support for their argument, Grievants cite a provision in the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA) that addresses the circumstances under which a party can seek judicial relief 
from an administrative agency. The provision in question reads as follows: 
(h) [relief can be granted when] the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the 
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reason 
that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. (Emphasis supplied). 
Utah Code, 63-46(b)-16(4)(h) (1997). 
Quoting from a portion of footnote 12 in Grievant's Posthearing Brief Grievant's state: 
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"Haun cannot (consistent with merit principles) grant an ASI to one employee so as to remedy a pay 
inequity and then deny another employee's request on the sole basis that he has discretion to do so 
under DHRM rules." 
Anticipating the Agency's reliance on a long line of PRB and CSRB cases denying pay 
inequity grievances, Grievants argue that: (a) the doctrine of stare decisis (reliance on previous case 
law) does not apply to administrative proceedings; and (b) even if stare decisis does apply, their 
case is distinguishable from those previous pay inequity cases because it involves the violation of 
the above-mentioned statutes. 
THE AGENCY'S CASE 
The Agency responds to Grievant's case by arguing that:4 (a) the doctrine of stare decisis 
does apply to administrative proceedings, and thus, the long line of PRB and CSRB cases denying 
pay inequity grievances does apply in this case;5 (b) the granting of an ASI under R477-7-4(l 1) is 
discretionary with the executive director, and the decision denying the ASF s requested by Grievants 
in this case was not an abuse of that discretion; and (c) the Agency did not violate the statutes cited 
by Grievants because the Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM), not UDC, is 
responsible for carrying out those statutes. 
In short, the Agency argues that Grievants received all salary increases to which they were 
entitled, and are being paid appropriately, considering their experience, education, and longevity. 
Any other increase could only come as an ASI pursuant to R477-7-4(l 1). ASFs, by law, can be 
denied or granted at the discretion of the Agency executive director. The Agency argues that the 
decision by the executive director denying the ASTs was a proper exercise of discretion, and thus, 
the grievance should be denied. 
DISCUSSION 
My analysis of this matter will be broken down into three areas: previous pay inequity cases; 
statutes; and administrative rule. 
The Agency raised additional arguments in its pre-hearing and post-hearing briefs, but the three 
arguments set forth above are representative of all their arguments. 
The pay inequity cases cited by the Agency include the following: CC Patel v. Division of 
Environmental Health, 4 CSRB 37 (1991); Lund v. Division of Health Care Financing, 3 PRB 24 (1987); and 
Division of Environmental Health v. Pitkin and Sudweeks, 2 PRB 15 (1984). 
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Previous Pay Inequity Cases 
Pay inequity grievances have traditionally not fared well in the State's career service system, 
whether decided by the Career Service Review Board (CSRB), or its predecessor body - the 
Personnel Review Board (PRB). 
In reviewing a pay inequity case on appeal from Step 5 as early as 1984, the PRB vacated a 
hearing officer's decision that had awarded a two-step increase based on pay inequity. After 
discussing the legal definition of the term "equity," the PRB held, " [ e ^ t y alone . . . is not a 
controlling principle upon which employment relations' remedies are conditioned." Division of 
Environmental Health v. Pitkin andSudweeks, 2 PRB 15, 8 (1984). 
Three years later in another pay inequity case, Lund v. Division of Health Care Financing, 
3 PRB 24 (1987), the PRB quoted as follows from its previous decision in Pitkin, "[w]hen and if 
cases are determined on the basis of 'equity' alone, they may not be dispositive to legally sound or 
logically reasoned decision-making." Pitkin at 8. The PRB went on to say: 
[T]here will likely always exist salary inequities for some employees 
given the size of the State's work force, its turnover and hiring 
practices, its change in philosophies by different administrations and 
department executives, its rather persistent changing of personnel 
rules in order to adapt to changing conditions and exigencies, and for 
other germane reasons that need not be included herein. Lund at 8. 
Since then, the CSRB has followed Lund in pay inequity cases. For example, in C. G Patel 
v. Division of Environmental Health, 4 CSRB 37 (1991), the Board referred to Lund and said: 
Previously the Board has noted that not all employees with the same 
job title are paid at the same rate. The State's current pay plans do not 
contemplate identical pay rates for similarly situated employees 
because variable factors foster pay rate differences. Variations in 
employees1 salaries result from such factors and conditions as 
promotions, career mobility assignments, varying amounts of merit 
money increases, legislatively-imposed Statewide salary freezes, cost 
of living adjustments (COLAs) which alter the State pay plans' entry 
rates (creating salary compression), length of service, long-term 
leaves of absence, interrupted service and rehirings [sic], 
reassignments, disciplinary penalties, and other job-related factors. 
Patel at 9. 
In their post hearing briefs, Grievants try valiantly to challenge the application of these pay 
inequity decisions to their case. Their challenge is waged primarily on two fronts: (a) that the 
doctrine of stare decisis does not apply in administrative proceedings, and therefore, prior PRB and 
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CSRB cases are irrelevant in this proceeding; and (b) that Lund and Pitkin are distinguishable 
because they are based on equity alone, while their case involves the violation of three state statutes. 
In my opinion, the doctrine of stare decisis does apply in this proceeding. I find the cases 
cited by the Agency on this issue to be persuasive, hi Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain 
States Telephone^ Telegraph Co., 846 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court held: 
We Have previously stated that stare decisis has limited applicability 
to administrative agency cases, see Williams v. Public Serv. Comm 'n. 
754 P.2d\41, 52 (Utah 1988), but that is because of the innumerable 
kinds of decisions that administrative agencies make. This limitation 
does not apply where administrative law making is done pursuant 
to formal procedures similar to those employed in judicial 
proceedings\[Citation omitted.] (Emphasis supplied.) 846 P.2d at 
1252. 
Furthermore, the holding In Mountain States was upheld by the Court in Steiner Corp. v. 
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm 'n.9 979 P.2d 357 (Utah 1999). The Court said: 
Mountain States [cited above] held that rules established in formal 
agency adjudications have the force of stare decisis in future agency 
decisions. [Citation omitteq.] 
Mountain States stands for th£\proposition that it would be arbitrary 
and capricious for an agency tVapply a different rule of law in a 
future case with similar facts. See^d at 1252. It is as arbitrary and 
capricious to apply the same law to the same facts and reach a 
different result as it is to apply a diffident rule in a factually similar 
situation. Simply put "Stare decisis meahs that like facts will receive 
like treatment in a court of law." [Citation^ omitted.] The holding of 
an agency adjudication, or the application oJKa rule of law to the facts 
in that case, binds an agency in subsequent decisions under Mountain 
States. 979P.2dat361. 
I think Mountain States is good law here because admiiiistrative law making before the 
CSRB "is done pursuant to formal procedures similar to those employed injudicial proceedings." 
846 P.2d at 1252. The fact that the CSRB has no administrative rule mandating that Step 5 hearing 
officers are bound by Step 6 CSRB decisions or other Step 5 decisions issued by other hearing, 
officers is not persuasive. 
Statutes 
Grievants also attempt to distinguish their case from prior pay inequity c&ses decided by the 
PRB and CSRB by arguing their case involves more than just a pay inequity. Gn^vants claim the 
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additional issue in their case is the violation of three statutes in the Utah State Personnel 
Management Act Those statutes are Utah Code, Sections 67-19-12 (3)(a), 67-19-12 (3)(b), and 67-
19-3.1.1 find their argument unpersuasive for three reasons. 
First, the responsibility for enforcing and carrying out the statutes in question belongs to 
DHRM, not to UDC. The term "Department" is defined in Section 67-19-3(7) to mean DHRM. 
Thus, where Section 67-19-3.1, charges the department with the responsibility of establishing a 
career service system that will provide for "equitable and competitive compensation," the 
responsibility lies with DHRM, not UDC. Similarly, the term "director" as it is used in Section 
67-19-12(3)(a), refers to the DHRM director, not to the UDC director, because, in accordance with 
Section 67-19-8, it is DHRM, not UDC, that is tasked with the responsibility of designing and 
administering the state pay plan and classification system. Thus the responsibility to "prepare, 
maintain, and revise a position classification plan for each employee position... to provide equal 
pay for equal work" belongs to the DHRM director, not the UDC director. The foregoing analysis 
is supported by Section 67-19-9(2) which limits the role of State agencies to one of "recommending 
position classifications and grade allocations." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Second, even if the responsibility for preparing, maintaining, and revising the State pay plan 
and classification system belonged to UDC, I do not read Sections 67-19-12(3)(a) and (b) the same 
way as do Grievants. Grievants read those two subsections as meaning employees who have similar 
education and experience and who are classified the same because they do the same work, must have 
the same salaries. I read them to mean employees who are classified the same because they do the 
same work must have the same salary ranges. In that regard, while Grievants and the two employees 
with whom they compare themselves do not have the same salaries, they do have the same salary 
ranges. 
Third, in addition to not being legally required to pay the same salaries to employees who 
have similar education, seniority, and identical classifications, it is impractical to do so. The reasons 
for that are set forth in Patel, Lund, and Pitkin. They include such factors as promotions, career 
mobility assignments, varying amounts of merit money increases, legislatively imposed statewide 
salary freezes, cost of living adjustments, length of service, long term leaves of absence, interrupted 
service and rehires, reassignments, disciplinary penalties, and other job related factors. 
In short, even though Grievants argue that their case involves more than "equity alone," I do 
not agree with their argument alleging statutory violations. 
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Administrative Rule 
Grievants argue that R477-7-4(ll) provides the remedy to correct their pay inequity. 
Grievant's argument in this regard is set forth above in the presentation of the Agency's case and will 
not be restated here. I disagree with Grievant's argument for two reasons. 
First, the granting of an ASI is not mandatory. It is discretionary with the agency head. 
R477-7-11(11) states: "The agency head . . . is the final authority for salary actions within these 
guidelines. The agency head . . . shall answer any challenge or grievance resulting from an 
administrative salary increase." Id Therefore, even though one of the justifications set forth in the 
ASI rule is "equity reasons," an executive director may choose not to use it. 
In Lopez v. Career Service Review Board, 834 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1992), the court said: 
Discretionary personnel powers granted to agencies do not constitute 
mandates. Absent a statutory mandate that an employee receive a 
certain benefit, the employee may not demand it as a matter of right. 
Id at 574. 
Grievants attempt to distinguish their case from Lopez by arguing that their case involves 
a "statutory mandate" while Lopez does not. Grievants state: 
[W]hen there is a statutory mandate, the Legislature creates an 
entitlement and a right in the employee. Such a right is created by the 
three (3) provisions contained in the USPMA . . . and no additional 
violation of rules needs to be proven by Grievants. Grievants' 
Post/tearing Brief at 14 and 15. 
However, as stated previously in this decision, I do not agree that the three USPMA statutes 
constitute a mandate in favor of Grievants. Accordingly, I find that Lopez does apply in this case. 
Second, Grievants argue that the Agency's granting of an ASI to Mr. Braithwaite, while 
contemporaneously denying their ASI request, was arbitrary and capricious because it was 
inconsistent. In support of their argument, Grievants cite Section 63-46b-16 (4)(h)(iii) of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) which provides for relief if the agency action is: 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies 
the inconsistency by giving facts and reason that demonstrate a fair 
and rational basis for the inconsistency. 
I believe Grievant's reliance on UAPA is misplaced. In addressing the scope and 
applicability of UAPA, Section 63-46b-l (2) reads as follows: 
(2) This chapter does not govern: 
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(e) applications for employment and internal personnel actions 
within an agency concerning its own employees, or judicial review 
of those actions. (Emphasis supplied). 
Proceedings at Steps 5 and 6 of the grievance procedure are not internal personnel actions 
and for that reason UAPA does apply to matters heard at that level. However, the decision by the 
then executive director, Pete Haun, to deny Grievant's request for ASF s, was a Step 4 decision, i.e., 
an internal agency personnel action, and is therefore exempt from the provisions of UAPA.6 
DECISION 
For the foregoing reasons, the grievance should be, and hereby is denied. 
DATED this 13th day of December 2002. 
Hearing/Presiding Officer 
Career Service Review Board 
RECONSIDERATION 
Any request for reconsideration must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten working days 
upon receipt of this decision. Utah Administrative Code R137-l-21(12)(b). 
APPEAL 
Any appeal of this formal adjudicative decision must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten 
working days upon receipt of this decision according to Utah Code §67-19a-407(l)(a)(i). 
6
 For that reason it is not necessary to address in depth die case of Pickett v. Utah Department of 
Commerce, 858 P2d 187 (Utah App. 1993) which Grievants rely on to claim that they met their initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case of inconsistent treatment Grievants argue that because they met their initial burden, 
the burden shifted to the Agency to demonstrate a ''fair and rational" basis for the Agency's so called inconsistent 
treatment Admittedly Director Haun's final order did not specifically address why Mr. Braithwaite's ASI was 
granted while Grievant's ASI's were denied- However, his final order does indicate in the fourth paragraph on page 
1 that any comparisons outside the rank of captain would be comparing "apples to oranges." That reference, coupled 
with the fact that Mr. Braithwaite is a licensed professional pharmacist, rather than a captain, arguably explains 
Director Haun's reason for treating them differently. Moreover, characterizing the granting of a single ASI as a 
"prior practice" may be stretching the meaning of die word "practice." No evidence was submitted regarding how 
many ASI's were denied. 
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ADDENDUM "B 
FILE C O P Y 
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
CRAIG BURR and LOWELL H. CLARK, 
Grievants and Appellants, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS, 
Agency and Respondent. 
DECISION 
AND 
FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
CaseNos. 7 CSRB 69 (Step 6) 
18 CSRB/H.0.259 (Step 5) 
On Thursday, October 23, 2003, the Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) 
completed its appellate review of the above-entitled case with a hearing involving the parties and an 
executive session. The following Board members were present and heard oral argument at the 
hearing and deliberated in an executive session: Gloria E. Wheeler, Acting Chair, Felix J. McGnw?m; 
Joan M. Gallegos, and Dale L. Whittle. Messrs. Craig Burr and Lowell H. Clark 
(Grievants/Appellants) were present and represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law, who 
presented oral argument on Appellants' behalf. Carey A. Seager, Attorney at Law, was also present 
and assisted Mr. Dyer at Counsel's table. Assistant Attorney Patrick B. Nolan, represented the 
Department of Corrections (Department and DOC) with Linda Whitney, Human Resource Manager, 
present as the Department's management representative. 
AUTHORITY 
The Board's statutory authority is set forth in the Utah Code Annotated at §§ 67-19a-101 
through -408 (Supp. 1998) (hereinafter Utah Code) of the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures Act, which is a sub-part of the Utah State Personnel Management Act (USPMA) at 
§§ 67-19 etseq. The CSRB's administrative rules are published in the Utah Administrative Code at 
R137-1-1 through -23 (Supp. 1998). This Board-level or Step 6 appeal hearing is the final 
administrative review in the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures for Messrs. Burr 
and Clark's appeal of the denial of their salary grievance. Both the Board's evidentiary/Step 5 and 
these appellate/Step 6 proceedings are designated as "formal adjudications" pursuant to Rl 37-1-
18(2)(a). Therefore, those provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) pertaining 
to formal adjudications are applicable to the CSRB's Step 5 and Step 6 hearings. (§§ 63-46b et seq) 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On or about May 28,1998, Appellants "submitted a 'pay inequity' grievance alleging that 
the Department of Corrections (the agency) had inequitably applied the Captain's salary range" 
between Appellants and others employed by the Department in the same position. (Appellants' Brief 
on Appeal at 2). The remedy or relief sought by Appellants was to have their salary increased by 
four steps. (Utah Department of Corrections Staff Grievance, May 28,1998).1 
On May 28, 1998, the Career Service Review Board's Administrator consolidated the 
Appellants' grievances pursuant to CSRB rule R137-1-17. The Department's final order or Step 4 
decision was issued on July 18,2000. (Agency Ex. 1). 
In making his Final Decision, former Executive Director H.L. "Pete" Haun reviewed the 
salary histories ofAppellantsand others holding thesamepositionas Appellants^-Aftereonducting-
his review, Executive Director Haun determined that Appellants had received all "the increases to 
which they were entitled." (Id.) Moreover, Executive Director Haun determined that administratis 
salary increases were discretionary and that the favorable exercise of discretion at one point of an 
employee's career does not entitle others to receive administrative salary increases when the 
employees' career paths merge. (Id.) 
After considering all these factors, Executive Director Haun concluded that "discretion to 
grant administrative salary increases is found in the current rule, R477-7-3(l 1) . . . The increase must 
be justified... In these circumstances I do not see how the increases Mr. Burr and Mr. Clark seek 
can be justified. Therefore, I deny their grievances." (Id.) 
Thereafter, on or about August 11,2000, Appellants timely filed their appeal of Executive 
Director Pete Haun's Final Decision with the CSRB. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A, STEP 5 EVIDENTIARY ISSUES AND RULING 
On Wednesday, August 14, and Thursday, August 15,2003, a Step 5 evidentiary hearing was 
held before CSRB Hearing J. Francis Valerga (Hearing Officer). At the hearing, Appellants were 
represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law. The Department was represented by 
Patrick B. Nolan, Assistant Attorney General. Assisting Mr. Nolan, was the Department's 
management representative, David Salazar, the Human Resource Director for the Department 
^ e s e grievances are part of the file maintained by the CSRB. 
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The statute authorizing the CSRB to hold an evidentiary hearing can be found at Utah Code, 
§ 67-19a-406. Moreover, because Appellants are challenging the Department's denial of their 
grievance relating to salary or wages, Grievants have the burden of proving their case by substantial 
evidence and the burden of going forward. (Utah Code, § 67-19a-406(2)(b) and (c)) The specific 
issues adjudicated at the Appellants' Step 5 hearing were twofold. First, were Grievants entitled to 
prevail on their salary or wage grievance? If so, what was the appropriate remedy? (Prehearing 
Conference Summary and Order, at 2, Tf 6; Notice of Rescheduled Administrative Hearing, May 2, 
2002; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order, at 1) 
On or about May 1,2001, prior to the evidentiary hearing on this matter, the Department filed 
two separate motions in this case. The first was a Motion to Dismiss along with an accompanying 
Memorandum in Support asking that the Appellants'_grievance be dismissed for failure to allege a 
specific "violation of a law or rule." The second was a Motion for Order in Limine requesting an 
order to exclude "any evidence or testimony relating to salary comparison of persons not classified 
as 'captain' within the Utah Department of Corrections." On July 2, 2001, the Hearing Officer 
entered a joint order denying both the Department's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Order in 
Limine. 
At the evidentiary hearing on this matter, the hearing officer received evidence relating to 
Appellants' salary grievance. Specifically, there was testimony given and documentary evidence 
received concerning the Appellants' salary, both at the time of the filing of their grievance2 and at 
the time of the hearing, in relation to other departmental employees employed in the same job 
classification as Appellants and performing the same or similar work.3 
In addition, testimony was heard and evidence received concerning the granting of 
2
 Both Mr. Burr and Mr. Clark filed their original grievance in May 1998. These grievances are 
essentially identical, both in the statement of the problem and the relief requested. Based upon these facts, 
the then CSRB Administrator consolidated the grievances in accordance with CSRB rule R137-1-17. This 
consolidation was done pursuant to separate letters to Messrs. Burr and Clark dated May 28,1998. 
3
 Appellants' case focuses primarily on two specific employees employed by the Department in the 
same job classification as Appellants, doing the same or similar work as Appellants, but being paid more. 
However, evidence was clearly received regarding other employees employed by the Department in the same 
job classification as Appellants' and performing the same or similar work. The two employees with whom 
Appellants compared themselves are William Carlson and Randall Keven Harr. At the time of the Step 5 
evidentiary hearing, the undisputed facts establish that Appellants Burr and Clark were making $21.88 and 
$21.29 respectively. (Exhibit G2, G12; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order at 5 n.3) 
At the time of the hearing, Mr. Carlson and Mr. Harr were making $24.3 8 and over $25.00 respectively. (Id.) 
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administrative salary increases (ASI) under Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM) 
rale R477-7-4-(ll).4 Specifically, evidence was received and considered as to whether the 
Department's Executive Director's decision to deny Appellants an ASI was an arbitrary or otherwise 
an abuse of discretion.5 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Hearing Officer entered his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decision (Step 5 Decision) dated December 13, 2002. In reaching this 
Step 5 Decision, the Hearing Officer clearly examined the evidence presented at the evidentiary 
hearing and carefully considered the legal arguments presented by the parties both at the hearing and 
in their post-trial briefs.6 After reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing and examining the 
relevant statutes, the Hearing Officer entered his Step 5 Decision denying Appellants' grievance and 
upholdingihe Department's Final-Order dated July 18^ 20D(L(StepJ Decision at 12)Inreachingiris__ 
Step 5 Decision, the Hearing Officer essentially concluded that the Department had not violated 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-12(3)(a), (b) or 67-19-3.1. The Hearing Officer also concluded that the 
denial of the ASI's sought by Appellants was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion and 
constituted a discretionary internal personnel matter exempt from review by the CSRB.(JJ. at5,11) 
B. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
In the Appellants' appeal before this Board, they challenge numerous aspects of the Hearing 
Officer's Step 5 Decision. Specifically, Appellants argue that the Hearing Officer erred in legally 
concluding that Appellants had received all the salary increases to which they were entitled by law 
and that the specific statutory provisions relied upon by Appellants in support of their salary 
grievance applied to salary ranges, not to individual salaries. (Appellants' Brief on Appeal at 4-5, 
16-18) 
4The Board notes that the DHRM rule existing at the time Appellants filed their grievance has been 
modified and that the existing rule received into evidence as Exhibit A2 omits "equity issues" as a reason 
supporting the granting of an ASI. The Hearing Officer did however, with the approval of the parties, hand 
write into Exhibit A2 the words "equity issues" which accurately reflects the wording of the rule at the time 
Appellants filed their grievance (TrU at 156-159). 
5At the time Appellants filed their grievance, H.L. "Pete" Haun was the executive director of the 
Department. Mr. Haun issued his Final Order on July 18, 2000, denying Appellants' grievance at the 
departmental level. This Final Order was timely appealed to the CSRB on August 11,2000. 
Review of the Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision establishes numerous references to the case law 
cited by both parties in their post-trial briefs and specifically quotes from pages 14-15 of the Appellants' 
post-trial brief. 
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In addition, Appellants challenge the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the Department's 
Executive Director's decision to deny Appellants' grievance and not grant the four-step ASI 
Appellants requested was arbitrary or otherwise an abuse of discretion. Appellants also challenge 
the Hearing Officer's finding that the Department's decision to not grant an ASI to Appellants was 
an internal, discretionary personnel action and therefore exempt from review by the CSRB and the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(2). 
Appellants also assert that the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the responsibility for 
enforcing and carrying out the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-12(3)(a), (b) and 67-19-3.1 
is the responsibility of DHRM. Appellants assert that their rights are independent of whether DHRM 
or the Department is responsible for implementing these statutes and that any failure on the part of 
DHRM does not excuse the Department from complying with theseprovisions. {Appellants!-Brie£ 
on Appeal at 4,21) 
Finally, in their Brief on Appeal, Appellants challenge two factual findings of the Hearing 
Officer. These challenges focus primarily on the Hearing Officer's findings concerning the work 
duties and responsibilities of the Correctional Institution Program Coordinator, Correctional Support 
Services Supervisor HI and the Correctional Captain7 and Appellants' assertion that no specific 
reasons were identified for the differences in pay between Appellants and Messrs. Carlson and Harr 
specifically. 
In essence, Appellants challenge the Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision that the disparity in 
salary between Appellants and other Department employees performing the same or similar duties 
as Appellants and in their same job classification does not violate the provisions of the USPMA, 
specifically §§ 67-19-12(3)(a), 67-19-12(3)(b) or 67-19-3.1(l)(b). Appellants also assert that the 
Hearing Officer erred in determining that the Department's Executive Director's decision to deny 
Appellants' grievance and the four-step ASI which they requested was not arbitrary, capricious or 
otherwise an abuse of discretion. Finally, Appellants assert that two of the factual findings of the 
Hearing Officer were not supported by substantial evidence and therefore are, ostensibly, insufficient 
to uphold his conclusions of law. Each of these issues will be addressed in the remainder of this 
7For purposes of this Decision and Final Agency Action, the Board will follow the designations given 
to these positions by the parties at the evidentiary hearing. The Correctional Institution Program Coordinator 
will hereinafter be referred to as die "PC." The Correctional Support Services Supervisor HI will be referred 
to the "SSIII," and the Correctional Caption will be referred to simply as "Captain." 
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Decision and Final Agency Action. 
C. THE BOARD'S APPELLANT STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
We review Appellant's appeal under Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(a)-
(c), (Supp. 2003), which reads as follows: 
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational according 
to the substantial evidence standard. When the board determines that the 
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational 
based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in 
its discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or additional 
factual findings. 
(b) Once the board has either detennined that the factual findings of the 
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the 
factual findingsiased upon4he^videntiaiy/-stq)^^^coi^as^4vhole^the-
board must then determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly 
applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes in accordance with the 
correctness standard, with no deference being granted to the 
evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB 
hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the 
agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings 
and correct application of relevant policies, rules, and statutes determined 
according to the above provisions. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Board must first determine whether the Hearing Officer's 
factual findings are reasonable and rational based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and 
whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Next, our task is to review the fact 
finder's decision to determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly applied "the relevant policies, 
rules, and statutes according to the correctness standard," giving no deference to the Hearing Officer 
on this legal issue. Finally, the Board's appellate role is to consider whether the decision of the 
Hearing Officer is reasonable and rational based upon our determination of the ultimate facts 
together with the correct application of relevant State policies, rules and statutes which wore 
considered by the Hearing Officer. 
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BOARD REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
OF FACTS AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
L PRIOR BOARD CASES ADDRESSING SALARY EQUITY GRIEVANCES 
At the outset, the Board cites with approval to the long line of Board cases holding that 
"equity alone . . . is not a controlling principle upon which employment relations' remedies are 
conditioned." (Division of Environmental Health v. Pitkin andSudweeks, 2 PRB 15,7 (1984))8 The 
Board continues to believe the principles supporting this ruling are sound and perhaps best stated 
in Lund v. Division of Health Care Financing, 3 PRB 24 (1987) wherein our predecessor board 
stated: "When and if cases are determined on the basis of'equity5 alone, they may not be dispositive 
to legally sound or logically reasoned decision-making." (Id at 8) 
In Lund, the PRB went t>n to conclude that: 
[Tjhere will likely always exist salary inequities for some employees given 
the size of the State's work force, its turnover and hiring practices, its 
change in philosophies by different administrations and department 
executives, its rather persistent changing of personnel rules in order to 
adapt to changing conditions and exigencies, and for other germane reasons 
that need not be included herein. 
(id.) 
Following the Lund decision, the Board again decided a pay equity salary grievance in 
CC Patel v. Division of Environmental Health, 4 CSRB 37 (1991). In this case, the Board held 
that: 
Previously the Board has noted that not all employees with the same job 
title are paid at the same rate. The State's current pay plans do not 
contemplate identical pay rates for similarly situated employees because 
variable factors foster pay rate differences. Variations in employees' 
salaries result from such factors and conditions as promotions, career 
mobility assignments, varying amounts of merit money increases, 
legislatively-imposed Statewide salary freezes, cost of living adjustments 
(COLAs) which alter the State pay plans' entry rates (creating salary 
compression), length of service, long-term leaves of absence, interrupted 
service and rehiring [sic], reassignments, disciplinary penalties, and other 
job-related factors. 
(Mat9)9 
This decision was decided by the Personnel Review Board (PRB). The PRB was the predecessor 
of the Career Service Review Board. 
9By way of footnotes in both their Brief on Appeal and in their Post-Hearing Reply Brief, Appellants 
argue that the Patel decision "supports" their position. (Appellants' Brief on Appeal at 18, Post-Hearing 
Burr & Clark v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 69 Page 7 
The Board finds it significant that at the time the Board decided Patel, the State's pay plan 
also required that the Department design a plan to achieve "equal pay for equal work." {Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19-2(4)(b) (1985)) Under that statutory framework, the Patel Board concluded that such 
provisions did not contemplate that all employees with the same job title would be paid the same. 
(Id.) Though there have been changes to the USPMA since Patel, the Board believes there still exist 
substantial and significant similarities between the current legislatively designed compensation 
system and the one existing at the time Patel was decided. 
Based upon these factors, the Board affirms and upholds the prior decisions cited above. The 
Board continues to believe that the State's current pay plan does not contemplate identical pay rates 
for employees performing similar or even the same duties. 
It is the finding of this Board that the State's compensation system, ^currently codified 
primarily at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12, has been purposely designed by the Legislature so that 
salary ranges for each class of position are to be expansive enough to allow for the normal growth 
and productivity potential of each individual employee, including those assigned to the same 
position. (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12(4)(c)(ii)). In addition, and as stated by the Board in Patel, the 
Reply Brief at 3) In support of their argument, Appellants cite to a portion of the Patel decision wherein the 
Board quoted from the hearing officer's Step 5 decision. The pertinent language cited by Appellants 
provides as follows: 
The pay range should reflect equal pay for equal work. (See UCA 
67-19-12(4).) The concept of equal pay for equal work is confined to 
employees with the same classification. Equal pay is not, as Mr. Patel 
argues, a generic concept comparing duties in different classifications. 
Mr. Patel is insured [of] equal pay for equal work within his 
classification" (Highlighted emphasis in original.) 
In the instant case, the Board does not believe the language set forth above "supports" Appellants' 
position. The Board believes this language applies to salary ranges and that salary ranges must reflect equal 
pay for equal work. Moreover, even assuming the hearing officer's language cited by Appellants applies to 
individual salaries, as opposed to salary ranges assigned to employee positions, the Board believes that 
Appellants' reliance on the Board's decision in Patel is misplaced. 
Close review of the Patel decision establishes that the Board never affirmatively adopted the hearing 
officer's language cited to and relied upon by Appellants. In fact, the Board purposely determined "to make 
a more reserved conclusion" than that reached by the Hearing Officer." (Id. at 9) Specifically, the Board 
held that it was not necessary for the hearing officer to make this "conclusion" to deny PateVs grievance. 
Instead, the Board reached its decision in Patel based primarily on State statutes which the Board simply 
concluded did not contemplate identical salaries between employees performing the same or similar duties. 
(Id.) 
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State's compensation system was also designed to achieve "comparability of State salaries to wages 
and salaries paid by private enterprise and other public employment for similar work." (Id. at 10) 
(Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12(4)(b)) 
Based upon the overall design and complexity of the State compensation system, the Board 
finds it is reasonable to believe - or even expect - that employees will grow and progress through 
their designated salary range at differing salary rates based upon the inevitable exigencies present 
in any workforce.10 It is also reasonable to expect that, on occasion, stresses and strains will result 
regarding salary comparisons or disparities between employees, even those in the same job 
classification. However, absent violation of statute or rule, such disparities are simply insufficient 
to allow an employee to prevail on a wage or salary grievance. 
n. REVIEW OF THE UTAH STATE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT 
REGARDING EQUITABLE AND COMPETITIVE COMPENSATION11 
In apparent recognition that "equity alone" is insufficient to support their grievance, 
Appellants assert that the statutory language cabined within Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-12(3)(a) and 
(b), and 67-19-3.1(1 )(b) requires that they be paid a salary "equal" to that paid to other individuals 
employed by the Department in their same job classification and performing the same or similar 
duties as Appellants. The specific statutory provision relied upon by Appellants in support of their 
argument provides as follows: 
(3Xa) The director shall prepare, maintain, and revise a position 
classification plan for each employee position not exempt under subsection 
(2) to provide equal pay for equal work. 
(b) Classification of positions shall be based on similarity of duties 
performed and responsibilities assumed, so that the same job requirements 
and the same salary range may be applied equitably to each position in the 
same class. (Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-12(3)(a) and (b) (Emphasis 
added)) 
67-19-3.1(1) The Department shall establish a career service system 
designed in a manner that will provide for the effective implementation of 
10Indeed, though unnecessary to the Board's decision in this matter, we can think of virtually no 
situation in State government where employees, even those filling the same position, are truly performing 
"equal work." Equal work is certainly not a factor in this case. (Tri, 29,47,61-62,126-127; Tr JI at 178-
180) (PateUtlO) 
1
 Providing for equitable and competitive compensation is one of the principles governing the 
interpretation of the USPMA. This is codified at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3.1. 
Burr & Clark v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 69 Page 9 
the following merit principles: 
* * * 
(b) providing for equitable and competitive compensation 
(Utah Code Ann. §67-19-3.1(l)(b) (2000) (emphasis added)) 
Appellants assert that these provisions of the USPMA "unequivocally" create a right for 
Appellants to receive "equal pay for equal work," equitable application of their salary range based 
on an "equal pay for equal work" premise and equitable and competitive compensation. (Appellants' 
on Appeal at 17) 
In addressing this specific argument, the Hearing Officer held that: "Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 67-19-12(3)(a) and (b) do not mean that employees who have similar education and experience 
and who are classified the same because they do the same work, must receive the same salaries. 
They mean such employees must have the same salary ranges." (Step 5 Decision at 5) 
Elaborating on these two statutory provisions, the Hearing Officer held that: 
I do not read Sections 67-19-12(3)(a) and (b) the same way as Grievants do. 
Grievants read those two subsections as meaning employees who have 
similar education and experience and who are classified the same because 
they do the same work, must have the same salaries. I read them to mean 
employees who are classified the same because they do the same work must 
have the same salary ranges. In that regard, while Grievants and the two 
employees with whom they compare themselves do not have the same 
salaries, they do have the same salary ranges. (Id. at 10) 
Further addressing Appellants' statutory claims of entitlement to "equal pay for equal work" 
(Appellants' Brief on Appeal at 17), the Hearing Officer concluded that: 
The agency has notviolated UtahCodet §§ 67-19-12(3)(a), 67-19-12(3)(b), 
or 67-19-3.1 of the Utah State Personnel Management Act by its actions in 
this case because the responsibility for enforcing and carrying out those 
statutes belongs to the Department of Human Resource Management and 
the agency cannot undertake functions which are reserved by law to another 
agency. (Step 5 Decision at 5) 
The Board agrees with the Hearing Officer's decision relating to Appellants' statutory claims 
of entitlement to "equal pay for equal work." First, the Board agrees that the responsibility for 
designing and implementing the statutes relied upon by Appellants rests with DHRM and not with 
the Department.12 Utah Code Ann, § 67-19-3(7) specifically defines Department as "Department of 
12The Board recognizes that this portion of our decision, relating to the responsibility for designing 
and implementing the provisions of the State's position classification and pay plans, is largely unessential 
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Human Resource Management." Utah Code Ann, § 67-19-3.1(1)0) specifically charges the 
Department, DHRM, with the responsibility of designing and implementing a career service system 
that allows for "equitable and competitive compensation." (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3.l(l)(b)) 
Likewise, it is the director of DHRM that is charged with the assignment set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19-12(3) of preparing and maintaining a position classification plan to provide "equal pay for 
equal work" and to ensure that the classification of positions reflect that "the same job requirements 
and the same salary range be applied equitably to each position in the same class." (Id.) 
The Board believes that a plain reading of the State's entire compensation system codified 
primarily at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12 requires that the director of DHRM design and administer 
its provisions. Indeed, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-8(1) and (2) provide that the design and 
administration of the State's classification system and pay plan-are fiinctionsDHRM-mustperfbrm 
and cannot delegate.13 The Department's role is limited by statute to assisting DHRM by 
recommending position classifications and grade allocations. (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-9(2)). 
Second, and as touched upon in Section I above, the Board does not believe the Department's 
actions in this case violate the statutes relied upon by Appellants to support their claim of entitlement 
to "equal pay for equal work." As stated previously, the Board does not believe that the State's 
current compensation system requires that employees who are in the same job or position 
classification and performing the same or similar duties must receive the same individual salaries. 
It is sufficient if each employee position within the State's position classification plan is assigned 
to a salary range allowing for equal pay for equal work between comparable employee positions. 
The emphasis of Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12(3) is on employee positions not individual 
salaries. Indeed, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12(4)(c) specifically contemplates that each employee 
position will be assigned "to a salary range broad enough to reflect the normal growth and 
productivity potential of employees" assigned to a particular position. 
Reading these statutes as a whole, the Board does not believe that the Legislature 
contemplated that the "normal growth and productivity potential" of employees assigned to a 
in light of our ultimate conclusions that the statutes relied upon by Appellants in this case, specifically Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 67-19-3.1, 67-19-12(3)(a) and (b), were not violated. However, the Board has chosen to 
address this issue for clarity purposes. 
13The specific language set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-8 states that: "The department shall 
perform the following functions. . . .(1) design and administration of the state pay plan; (2) design and 
administration of the state classification system and procedures for determining schedule assignments." 
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position would be in lockstep. Rather, salary ranges are designed to enable employees, once 
assigned to a position, to advance through the salary range based upon their own individual growth 
or productivity. Based upon these factors, it is reasonable to expect variations in individual salaries 
between employees within the same salary range. 
In the instant case, the facts establish that Appellant Burr became a Captain in April 1992. 
(Gvt. Ex. 12, Agency Ex. 3; Tr.I at 104,113; TrU at 186). Appellant Clark became a Captain in 
June 1993. (GvtEx. 12,AgencyEx.3;Tr.Iatl28;Tr.IIatl86). Since those dates, the Department 
has transferred Appellants on several occasions between the positions of Captain, IPC and SSIEE.14 
(Gvt.Ex.12). These transfers involved no loss of salary or salary range to Appellants. (Gvt. Ex. 12). 
From the record, it appears that once an employee attains the position of Captain, IPC, or SSIH the 
Department has-with-some regularity-transferred its employees among these-three positions. 
(Tr.Iat29,56). 
Significantly, the Board notes that at all times relevant to this matter, the salary range 
attached to the positions of Captain, IPC, and SSDI were/are identical. (Tr.I at 26,28,57,64,174). 
The salary range attached to these positions is 47-64. (Id.).15 In addition, it is clear from the record 
that the Department, for staffing and perhaps other purposes, has treated the positions of Captain, 
PC and SSm as functionally interchangeable.16 (Id.; Tr.I at 43; Gvt. Ex. 3). 
Mr. Carlson and Mr. Harr are the specific individuals with whom Appellants compare 
themselves to establish their claims. Mr. Carlson became an SSDI in September 1993. (Gvt. Ex. 12; 
Tr.I at 383-384). Since that time, Mr. Carlson has also held the position of Captain and IPC. (Id.). 
14See Footnote 6 on page 5 
15Significantly, Appellants do not challenge that they are being paid within their appropriate salary 
range. Based upon the record as a whole, the Board finds that Appellants are being paid within their salary 
range. The Board also finds that Appellants have received all merited salary increases commensurate with 
their positions as captains and in relation to the duties and responsibilities they perform and the promotions 
they have received. (Tr.II at 181-182,191,208-209; Agency Ex. 1) 
16In his Step 5 Decision, the Hearing Officer found that "while the positions of IPC, SSIQ and 
Captain have been tf eated over the years somewhat interchangeable, they are not Captain positions because 
their functions are different" (Step 5 Decision, 3, Finding of Fact 25). 
To the extent our findings here correct those of the Hearing Officer on this limited fact, they are 
corrected. (See CSRB rule R137-l-22(4)(a).) However, for the reasons set forth in this decision, this 
correction is of little or no relevance and does not alter our determination to sustain the Hearing Officer's 
decision. 
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Likewise, Mr. Harr became an SSm in September 1993. (Gvt. Exs. 6,13; Tr.I at 66).17 
The facts of this case establish that since at least 1993, Messrs. Burr, Clark, Carlson and Harr 
have each occupied various positions within the Department having differing functions or 
assignments, but based upon the overall duties and responsibilities of those positions, the 
Department has treated these positions as functionally interchangeable. The facts also establish, 
however, that both prior to and after these individuals obtained their position of Captain, IPC or 
SSin, their career paths have been diverse and separate from each other. 
For example, each of these individuals was hired at different starting salaries.18 (Gvt. Ex. 12) 
Even at the time these individuals became what Appellants call "Captains," their salaries were 
variant, ranging between $12.27 per hour and $14.46 per hour (Id.) The differences in these 
individuals' current-salaries has also been impactediy numerous factors indudingXlost^Xivin& 
Adjustments (COLAs), merit increases, probationary increases, Market Comparability Analyses 
(MCAs) and promotions. (Gvt. Exs. 6,12)19 With respect to Mr. Carlson, the facts clearly establish 
that in March 1994, he received a substantial upward salary adjustment for temporarily assuming 
responsibilities of a higher level position. (Gvt. Ex. 12; Tr.II at 207-208). Based upon the 
evidentiary record, the Board finds this salary adjustment appropriate and does not believe that 
17Though Mr. Harr has held other positions since becoming an SSm, he has not had the position of 
IPC or Captain. (Id.) 
18Mr. Harr had the highest starting salary rate of $11.36 per hour. Mr. Harr was hired in 1990. 
Conversely, Mr. Clark's starting salary was $6.22 per hour. Mr. Clark was hired in 1983. Significantly, the 
Board notes that in 1990, when Mr. Harr was hired, his starting salary of $ 11.3 6 per hour was nearly a dollar 
more per hour than what Mr. Clark was making in 1990. By 1990, Mr. Clark had been employed with the 
Department for approximately seven years. Mr. Burr, who like Mr. Harr was hired in 1990, had a beginning 
salary nearly $1.50 per hour less than Mr. Harr. (Gvt Ex. 12). 
19With respect to merit and COLA increases, it is to be expected that those will never be uniformly 
applied to all employees holding the same position. If merit increases mean anything at all, they mean that 
employees receive increases based upon their individual productivity and growth in comparison with other 
similarly situated employees. (See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12(4)(c)(iii)). In addition, the disparity in 
relation to COLAs is best illustrated by the following example. If Employee A is making $10.00 per hour 
and Employee B is making $20.00 per hour, a one percent COLA increase across the board will result in a 
$.10 per hour raise for Employee A and a $.20 per hour raise for Employee B. The record establishes that 
since being hired, these individuals have all received merit and COLA increases. Based upon our discussion 
above, it is not reasonable to expect that these increases would be uniform. These are additional 
circumstances leading this Board to conclude that Appellants' reliance on Utah Code Ann. § § 67-19-3.1 ,and 
67-10-12(3 )(a) and (b) is misplaced. 
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granting such an adjustment was an abuse of discretion on the part of the Department.20 
As stated best by the Board in Patel, variations in employees' individual salaries "result from 
such factors and conditions as promotions, career mobility assignments, varying amounts of merit 
money increases, legislatively-imposed Statewide salary freezes, cost of living adjustments (COLAs) 
which alter the State pay plans' entry rates (creating salary compression), length of service, long-term 
leaves of absence, interrupted service and rehirings, reassignments, disciplinary penalties, and other 
job-related factors." {Patel at 9). 
The Board finds many of these factors present in the instant case. (Gvt. Ex.12; 
Agency Ex. 3) Moreover, Appellants are clearly being paid within their salary range and have 
received the salary increases to which they are entitled. (TrU at 181-182,191,209-210; Agency 
Ex.1) 
Applying the facts of this case to the statutory provisions governing the State's compensation 
system, including those relied on by Appellants, the Board finds the Hearing Officer's Step 5 
Decision to be correct. Furthermore, the Board simply does not believe that the law, as cited by 
Appellants, requires that employees whose positions are classified the same and who do the same 
or similar work, e.g., Captains, IPCs and SSIDLS, must receive the same individual salaries. 
Therefore, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's decision on this matter. 
HI. ADMINISTRATIVE RULES REGARDING SALARY INCREASES 
On appeal to this Board, Appellants do not challenge the Hearing Officer's Conclusion of 
Law that "[t]he granting or denying of an ASI21 in accordance with Utah Administrative Code, 
R477-7-4(ll) is not mandatory. It is discretionary with the agency head." (Step 5 Decision, 
Conclusion of Law 5, at 4). The Board agrees. 
In Lopez v. Career Service Review Board, 834 P.2d 568, 754, the Utah Court of Appeals 
addressed the jurisdictional parameters of the CSRB. In Lopez, the Court held that: 
Discretionary personnel powers granted to agencies do not constitute 
mandates. Absent a statutory mandate that an employee receive a certain 
benefit, the employee may not demand it as a right... Lopez has failed to 
20Again, to the extent our findings here correct the Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact 29, it is so 
corrected. (CSRB rule R137-l-22(4)(a)). 
21ASI is the common acronym for the DHRM rule allowing for administrative salary increases. As 
stated in footnote 4 above, at the time Appellants filed their grievance, this rule could be found at Utah 
Administrative Code R477-7-4(ll). It is currently found at Utah Administrative Code R477-6-4(10). 
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identify any personnel rule that was violated by the Commission's refusal 
to allow him to job share. Jurisdiction therefore was properly denied. 
(Id.Bt 9) (emphasis added). 
Based upon the Lopez decision, it is clear that the CSRB has no jurisdiction to review 
discretionary personnel decisions.22 Recognizing the need for such a statutory or administrative 
mandate, Appellants argue that such a mandate is cabined within the three previously cited statutes 
codified in the USPMA. (Appellants' Brief on Appeal at 19 and 20). As previously discussed at 
length above, the Board simply does not read the statutes as mandating equal pay for employees 
employed in the same job classification and performing the same or similar duties. Absent the 
finding of such a mandate, this Board upholds the Hearing Officer's decision.23 
Next, Appellants argue that the Department's Executive Director's decision to deny their ASI 
was arbitrary, capricious and constituted an abuse of discretion in violation of Utah Code Ann, 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(h). Appellants base this claim on the fact that in 1998, when Appellants' initial 
grievance was denied, the Department's Executive Director granted another employee within the 
Department a seven-step ASI.24 
The statute relied upon by Appellants provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the 
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has 
been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
* * * 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency 
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that 
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
The appellate record is essentially void of any challenge to the discretionary nature of the ASI rule. 
The only conceivable challenge the Board could identify is located at page 19 of the Appellants' Brief on 
Appeal wherein Appellants infer that the ASI rule is not discretionaiy. On page 19, the Appellants provide 
"[e]ven if this rule (ASI) is interpreted to grant discretion " 
^The Board notes that this case relates to "wage" or "salary". Appellants have alleged throughout 
the grievance process that the way to remedy their alleged "pay inequity" or wage disparity in comparison 
with other Department employees would be through an "ASF'. The Board notes however, that absent the 
underlying wage or salary issues present in this case, the CSKB would not even have "jurisdiction" to 
address ASIs. Lopez was a jurisdictional review. The Court clearly held that the CSRB does not have 
"jurisdiction" over discretionary personnel matters. 
24The evidentiary record identifies this other individual as James Braithwaite. (Tr.I at 86-89, Tr.II 
at 227). 
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In addressing Appellants' argument, the Board notes its agreement with the Hearing Officer that one 
instance, wherein the Department granted an ASI to another employee, does not equate to a "prior 
practice" as required by Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(h)(ui). In addressing this issue, the Hearing 
Officer correctly stated that "characterizing the granting of a single ASI as a 'prior practice' maybe 
stretching the meaning of the word 'practice5." (Step 5 Decision at 12 n.6). The Board simply 
does not find that the evidence presented at the hearing is sufficient to establish a "prior practice" 
by the Department 
Moreover, the evidence does not establish that the Executive Director's decision to deny 
Appellants' ASI was arbitrary or capricious. Executive Director Haun clearly examined the facts 
Appellants used in support of their request for an ASI and determined, within his lawful discretion, 
that Appellants had received all''the increases to which they were entitled." In making this 
determination, Executive Director Haun also noted that Appellants had, at various times during their 
employment, received ASIs, promotions and other increases. (Agency Ex. 1) 
However, even assuming, which the Board does not, that the granting of a single ASI by the 
Department creates a "prior practice" binding the Department, the Board finds that Appellants 
reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 67-46b-l et seq.25 is misplaced. The statutory scope and applicability 
of UAPA specifically exempt from its provisions internal personnel actions within an agency 
concerning its own employees, or judicial review of those actions. The specific language provides 
as follows: 
(2) This chapter does not govern: 
(e) P]ntemal personnel actions within an agency concerning its own 
employees, or judicial review of those actions; 
Executive Director Haun's departmental level or Step 4 decision was clearly an internal 
personnel action and therefore exempt from the provisions of UAPA. The Legislature has 
specifically designed and created the USPMA and the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures 
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-101 et seq. to address internal personnel actions within an 
agency concerning its own employees and review of those actions. 
Based upon these factors, the Board upholds the Hearing Officer's decision with respect to 
this issue. The Department's actions simply do not violate the provisions of UAPA which do not 
25
 This statute is commonly referred to as the Utah Administrative Procedures Act or UAPA. 
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apply to internal personnel actions, nor is there evidence that Executive Director Haun acted 
arbitrarily or inconsistently in denying Appellants' grievance. 
DECISION 
After careful review of the entire evidentiary record, the Board believes that the Hearing 
Officer's findings of fact relevant to address the legal issues raised by Appellants in their Brief on 
Appeal, are reasonable, rational and supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, it is clear that the 
Hearing Officer correctly applied the relevant statutes, policies and rules to the relevant facts of this 
case. Finally, the Board believes that the Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision was reasonable and 
rational based upon the relevant findings and correct application of the law. 
After thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary record and studying the issued raised by 
^^eHantsM)efore^s^t>ard^ 
reasons set forth herein and hereby denies Appellants' appeal to this Board. 
DATED this 22nd day of December 2003. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS 
Gloria E. Wheeler, Acting Chair 
Joan M. Gallegos, Member 
Felix J. McGowan, Member 
Dale L. Whittle, Member 
Gloria E. Wheeler, Acting Chair 
Career Service Review Board 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 formal adjudicative decision and final agency action 
by complying with Utah Administrative Code , R137-l-22(10), and Utah Code §63-46b-13, Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to 
Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-11, and Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
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